Abstract
Introduction
The subject of this paper is measurement, specifically, the measurement of those software attributes that are associated with software reliability. Existing approaches to the understanding of software reliability patently assume that software failure events are observable. The truth is that the overwhelming majority of software failures go unnoticed when they occur. Only when these unobserved failures disrupt the system by second, third or fourth order effects do they provide enough disruption for outside observation. Consequently, only those dramatic events that lead to the immediate collapse of a system can been seen directly by an observer when they occur. The more insidious failures will lurk in the code for a long interval before their effects are observed. Failure events go unnoticed and undetected because the software has not been instrumented so that these failure events may be detected. In that software failures go largely unnoticed, it is presumptuous to attempt to model the reliability of software based on observed failure events. If we cannot observe failure events directly, then we must seek another metaphor that will permit us to model and understand reliability in a context that we can measure.
Computer programs do not break. They do not fail monolithically. Programs are designed to perform a set of mutually exclusive tasks or functions. Some of these functions work quite well while others may not work well at all. When a program is executing a particular function, it executes a well defined subset of its code. Some of these subsets are flawed and some are not. Users tend to execute subsets of the total program functionality. Two users of the same software may have totally different perceptions as to the reliability of the same system. One user may use the system on a daily basis and never experience a problem. Another user may have continual problems in trying to execute exactly the same program.
A new metaphor for software systems would focus on the functionality that the code is executing and not the software as a monolithic system. In computer software systems, it is the functionality that fails. Some functions may be virtually failure free while other functions will collapse with certainty whenever they are executed. The focus of this paper is on the notion that it is possible to measure the activities of a system as it executes its various functions and characterize the reliability of the system in terms of these functionalities.
Each program function may be thought of as having an associated reliability estimate. We may chose to think of the reliability of a system in these functional terms. Users of the software system, however, have a very different view of the system. What is important to the user is not that a particular function is fragile or reliable, but rather whether the system will operate to perform those actions that the user will want the system to perform correctly. From a user's perspective, it matters not, then, that certain functions are very unreliable. It only matters that the functions associated with the user's actions or operations are reliable. The classical example of this idea was expressed by the authors of the early UNIX utility programs. In the last paragraph of the documentation for each of these utilities was a list of known bugs for that program. In general, these bugs were not a problem. Most involved aspects of functionality that the typical user would never exploit.
As a program is exercising any one of its many functionalities in the normal course of operation of the program, it will apportion its time across this set of functionalities [8] . The proportion of time that a program spends in each of its functionalities is the functional profile of the program. Further, within the functionality, it will apportion its activities across one to many program modules. This distribution of processing activity is represented by the concept of the execution profile. In other words, if we have a program structured into n distinct modules, the execution profile for a given functionality will be the proportion of program activity for each program module while the function was being expressed.
As the discussion herein unfolds, we will see that the key to understanding program failure events is the direct association of these failures to execution events with a given functionality. A stochastic process will be used to describe the transition of program modules from one to another as a program expresses a functionality. From these observations, it will become fairly obvious just what data will be needed to describe accurately the reliability of the system. In essence, the system will be able to appraise us of its own health. The reliability modeling process is no longer something that will be performed ex post facto. It may be accomplished dynamically while the program is executing. It is the goal of this paper to develop a methodology that will permit the modeling of the reliability of program functionality. This methodology will then be used to develop notions of design robustness in the face of departures from design functional profiles.
A Formal Description Of Program Operation
To assist in the subsequent discussion of program functionality, it will be useful to make this description somewhat more precise by introducing some notation conveniences. Assume that a software system S was designed to implement a specific set of mutually exclusive functionalities F. Thus, if the system is executing a function F f ∈ then it cannot be expressing elements of any other functionality in F. Each of these functions in F was designed to implement a set of software specifications based on a user's requirements. From a user's perspective, this software system will implement a specific set of operations, O. This mapping from the set of user perceived operations, O, to a set of specific program functionalities, F, is one of the major tasks in the software specification process.
To facilitate this discussion, it would be appropriate to describe the operations and the functionality of the Simple Database Management System (SDMS) that we have instrumented for test purposes. Though the majority of the systems that we have investigated and instrumented are very large (>500 KLOC) we would like demonstrate the use of this model in the context of a relatively small database application. The target application has 20 modules and approximately 1600 LOC. The methodology scales down quite well.
In order to implement the model, the first step was to re-discover the set A of user operations through the analysis of the program documentation. These operations, again specified by a set of functional requirements, will be mapped into a set, B, of elementary program functionalities. Then, the second step was the extraction of the system functionalities. The functionalities were extracted with a tool that analyzes the transition patterns as the program executes and generates a list of functionalities and the mapping of these functionalities to modules [3] . The tool was used because the requirements and design documentation wasn't complete enough to specify the operations, functionalities, modules and their mapping. The lack of complete and unambiguous development information is a common situation in the software industry which forces this type of re-engineering approaches.
Each operation that a system may perform for a user may be thought of as having been implemented in a set of functional specifications. There may be a one-to-one mapping between the user's notion of an operation and a program function. In most cases, however, there may be several discrete functions that must be executed to express the user's concept of an operation. For each operation, o, that the system may perform, the range of functionalities, f, must be well known. Within each operation one or more of the system's functionalities will be expressed. For a given operation, o, these expressed functionalities are those with the property )} ,
It is possible, then, to define a relation IMPLEMENTS over F O × such that IMPLEMENTS(o, f) is true if functionality f is used in the specification of an operation, o.
As an example of the IMPLEMENTS relation for a user operation within the framework of our demonstration example of a database application let us consider a typical user operation, the retrieval of a specific record.
In order to implement this operation ( i o ) the system will present the menu system to the user ( 1 f ), open the selected database ( 2 f ), perform the necessary query ( 3 f ) and then display the desired record
The software design process is basically a matter of assigning functionalities in F to specific program modules M m ∈ , the set of program modules. The design process may be thought of as the process of defining a set of relations, ASSIGNS over M F × such that ASSIGNS(f, m) is true if functionality f is expressed in module m. Table 1 shows an example of the ASSIGNS relation for four of the functions that IMPLEMENT the retrieval operation. In this example we can see the function 4 f has been implemented in the program modules { } 
. All of these modules will execute regardless of the specific functionality being executed by the software system.
Yet another set of software modules may or may not execute when the system is running a particular function. These modules are said to be potentially involved modules. The set of potentially involved modules is.
In other program modules, there is extremely tight binding between a particular functionality and a set of program modules. That is, every time a particular function, f, is executed, a distinct set of software modules will always be invoked. These modules are said to be indispensably involved with the functionality f. This set of indispensably involved modules for a particular functionality, f, is the set of those modules that have the property that
As a direct result of the design of the program, there will be a well defined set of program modules , f M , that might be used to express all aspects of a given functionality, f. These are the modules that have the property that
. From the standpoint of software design, the real problems in understanding the dynamic behavior of a The real problem is the set of potentially invoked modules, p M . The greater the cardinality of this set of modules, the less certain we may be about the behavior of a system performing that function. For any one instance of execution of this functionality, a varying number of the modules in p M may execute.
The Profiles of Software Dynamics
When a program is executing a functionality it will apportion its activities among a set of modules. As such it will transition from one module to the next on a call (or return) sequence. Each module called in this call sequence will have an associated call frequency. When the software is subjected to a series of unique and distinct functional expressions, there will be a different behavior for each of the user's operations in that each will implement a different set of functions that will, in turn, invoke possibly different sets of program modules.
When the process of software requirements specification is complete we will have specified a system consisting of a set of a mutually exclusive operations. It is a characteristic of each user of the new system that this user will cause each operation to be performed at a potentially different rate than another user. Each user, then, will induce a probability distribution on the set O of mutually exclusive operations. This probability function is a multinomial distribution.
It constitutes the operational profile for that user.
The operation profile of the software system is the set of unconditional probabilities of each of the operations in O being executed by the user. Then,
is the probability that the user is executing program operation k as specified in the functional requirements of the program and O is the cardinality of the set of functions [12] . A program executing on a serial machine can only be executing one operation at a time. The distribution of the operational profile, then, is multinomial for programs designed to fulfill more than two distinct operations. The prior knowledge of this distribution of functions should guide the software design process [7] . As a user performs the various operations on a system, he/she, will cause each operation to occur in a series of steps or transitions. The transition from one operation to another may be described as a stochastic process. In which case we may define an indexed collection of random variables } { t X , where the index t runs through a set of non-negative integers, K , 2 , 1 , 0 = t representing the individual transitions or intervals of the process. At any particular interval the user is found to be expressing exactly one of the system's a operations. The fact of the execution occurring in a particular operation is a state of the user. During any interval the user is found performing exactly one of a finite number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states that may be labeled 
Each user may potentially bring his/her own distinct behavior to the system. Thus, each user will have his/her own characteristic operational profile.
It is a characteristic, then, of each user to induce a probability function ]
on the set of operations, O. In that these operations are mutually exclusive, the induced probability function is a multinomial distribution.
As the system progresses through the steps in the software lifecycle, the user requirements specifications, the set O, must be mapped on a specific set of functionalities, F, by systems designers. This set F is in fact the design specifications for the system. As per our earlier discussion, each operation is implemented by one for more functionality. Now let us examine the behavior of the system within each operation. Each operation is implemented by one or more functionalities.
The transition from one functionality to another may be also be described as a stochastic process. In which case we may define a new indexed collection of random variables } { t Y , as before representing the individual transitions events among particular functionalities. At any particular interval a given operation is found to be expressing exactly one of the system's b functionalities. During any interval the user is found performing exactly one of a finite number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states that may be labeled 
From this condition probability distribution for all operations we may derive the functional profile for the design specifications as a function of a user operational profile to wit:
The next logical step is to study the behavior of a software system at the module level. Each of the functionalities is implemented in one or more program modules. The transition from one module to another may be also be described as a stochastic process. In which case we may define a third indexed collection of random variables } { t Z , as before representing the individual transitions events among the set of program modules. At any particular interval a given functionality is found to be executing exactly one of the system's c modules. The fact of the execution occurring in a particular module is a state of the system. During any interval the system is found executing exactly one of a finite number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states (program 
. From this condition probability distribution for all functionalities we may derive the module profile for the system as a function of a the system functional profile as follows:
The module profile ultimately depends on the operational profile. Each user's view of the system and the way that the activity of the system will be distributed across the modules in the software will depend on the user.
F Figure 1. Program Call Graph
Interestingly enough, for all software systems there is a distinguished module, the main program module that will always receive execution control from the operating system. If we denote this main program as module 0 then, 1 ] 0
Further, for epoch 1,
, in that control will have been transferred from the main program module to another function module.
An interesting variation on this stochastic process is one that has an absorbing state. In which case, 1
An example of such a system is a call graph that has a module that always exits to the operating system. Once this state has been entered, no other state is reachable from this absorbing state. We will use this notion of an absorbing state to model the failure of a system. In this case, we will consider the failure of a program module to be the transition from that module to the absorbing failure state. This modeling approach was initially explored by Littlewood [4] .
When a program module fails, we can imagine that the module has made a transition to a distinguished program module, a failure state. Thus, every program may be thought to have a virtual module representing the failed state of that program. This virtual program module is shown pictorially in program call graph of Figure 1 . When the virtual module receives control, it will not relinquish it, there are no returns from it. The transition matrix for this new model is augmented by an additional row and a new column. 
This represents the augmented row of the new transition matrix. Each row in the transition matrix will be augmented by a new column entry ) (n ie [6] . When program modules are executed that are fault prone, they are much more likely to fail than those that are not fault prone. We seek a forecasting or prediction mechanism that will capitalize on this understanding.
The granularity of the term epoch is now of interest. An epoch begins with the onset of execution in a particular module and ends when control is passed to another module. The measurable event for modeling purposes is this transition among the program modules. We will count the number of calls from a module and the number of returns to that module. Each of these transitions to a different program module from the one currently executing will represent an incremental change in the epoch number.
Computer programs executing in their normal mode will make state transitions between program modules rather rapidly. In terms of real clock time, many epochs may elapse in a relatively short period.
In reality, few if any systems are understood at the functional or operation level.
We are continually confronted with systems whose functionality is not completely understood. While we have developed methodologies to recapture the essential functionalities [cf. 3], the majority of the time we will not know the precise behavior of the system that we are working with. To this end we will develop a more relaxed form of profile called the execution profile of a system. When a user is exercising a system, the software will be driven through a sequence of functionalities
. Depending on the particular sequence of functionalities that are executed different sets of modules may or may not execute. From an empirical perspective, it makes a great deal of sense to model the behavior of a system in terms of an execution profile. This execution profile will be the conditional probability of execution a particular program module based on a sequence, S as follows:
That is, the execution profile tends to the module profile for large execution sequences. Necessarily, if the program is maintaining the transition matrix, it will not be able to update the vector for the virtual module that represents the failure state of the program. When the program transitions to this hypothetical state, it will be dead and unable to keep track of its own failures. In addition, in order to validate the model, consistent failure data was needed but not available for the application. To solve those problems, the application process was encapsulated to allow the trapping and simulation of failures. The capsule was designed to receive different types of process signals from the operating system, one of the signals provided a means to simulate a failure at any module at any time. When the process receives a failure signal from the operating system, it updates the vector for the virtual module representing the failure state simulating a failure. Other signals allow to observe the transition matrix at any time, to modify its contents, to estimate the current reliability of the system, etc. The purpose of this simple simulation scheme is to provide an inexpensive procedure to demonstrate the conceptual framework. The simulated failure assumes perfect fault coverage and a modular failstop behavior.
Estimates for Transition Probabilities and Profiles
The focus will now shift to the problem of understanding the nature of the distribution of the probabilities for various profiles. We have so far come to recognize these profiles in terms of their multinomial nature. The multinomial distribution is useful for representing the outcome of an experiment involving a set of mutually exclusive events. Let This particular distribution will be useful in the modeling of a program with a set of c modules. During a set of n epochs, each of the modules may be executed. These, of course, are mutually exclusive events. If module i is executing then module j cannot be executing. This principle of mutual exclusion is a requirement for the multinomial distribution.
The multinomial distribution function with parameters n and ) , , , 
We would like to come to understand, for example, the multinomial distribution of a program's execution profile while it is executing a particular functionality. The problem, here, is that every time a program is run we will observe that there is some variation in the profile from one execution sample to the next. It will be difficult to estimate the parameters ) , , , ( 2 1 e r r r K = r for the multinomial distribution of the execution profile. Rather than estimating these parameters statically, it would be far more useful to us to get estimates of these parameters dynamically as the program is actually in operation, hence the utility of the Bayesian approach [c.f. 5].
To aid in the process of characterizing the nature of the true underlying multinomial distribution, let us observe that the family of Dirichlet distributions is a conjugate family for observations that have a multinomial distribution [14] µ . This will represent the probability of a transition to the terminal failure state from a particular program module. So that we might use this value for our succeeding reliability prediction activities, it will be useful to know how good this estimate is. . (1) The value of the use of the Dirichlet conjugate family for modeling purposes is twofold. First, it permits us to estimate the probabilities of the module transitions directly from the observed transitions. Secondly, we are able to obtain revised estimates for these probabilities as the observation process progresses. Let us now suppose that we wish to model the behavior of a software system whose execution profile has a multinomial distribution with parameters n and ) , , , 
As an example, suppose that we now wish to model the behavior of a large software system with such a parametric vector . As the system makes sequential transitions from one module to another, the posterior distribution of R at each transition will be a Dirichlet distribution. Further, for e i , , 2 , 1 K = the th i component of the augmented parametric vectorα will be increased by 1 unit each time module i m is executed. Further, every time the system fails, the failure count, e x , will also increase my one.
Reliability Estimation
The modeling of reliability of systems will be implemented through the use of an absorbing state in the stochastic process. In this application, we will postulate the existence of a virtual program module representing the failure of the system. Should control ever be transferred to this module, it will never be returned. Each program module has a non-zero probability of transferring control to this virtual failure module. This probability is directly related to the fault proneness of the module. We may, in fact, use the functional relationship between software complexity and software faults to derive our prior probabilities for the transition between each program module and the virtual failed state module [c.f. 10].
What is important to understand is that each program module is distinctly related to one or more functions. If a function is expressed by a set of modules that are failure prone, then the function will appear to be failure prone. If, on the other hand, a function is expressed by a set of modules in a call tree that are fault free, this function will never fail. The key point is that it is a functionality that fails. Not all functions will be executed by a user with the same likelihood. If a user executes unreliable functions consistently, then he will perceive the system to be unreliable. Conversely, if another user were to use the same system but exercise functionalities that were not so likely to fail, then his perceptions of the same system would be very different.
In order to model the reliability of a software function, we will augment the basic stochastic model to include an absorbing state that represents a virtual program module called the failure state. Each program module may have a non-zero transition probability to this virtual module. If a module is fault free, then its transition probability will be zero.
To this point we have created a mechanism for modeling the transition of each program module to the failure state. In this sense the reliability of each module m i may be directly determined by the elements,
With the Bayesian approach, we have also established a mechanism for refining our estimates of these reliabilities and establishing a measure of confidence in each of these estimates. This information will now be used to establish the reliability of functions that employ each of the modules in varying degrees. The successive powers of 0 P will show the failure likelihood for each of the modules. This will permit us to postulate on the probability of a failure at some future epoch n based on the current estimates of failure probability.
A central thrust of this investigation is to establish a framework for establishing the reliability of program modules, the basic building blocks of a computer program. Each program module has an associated reliability. The total system is a composite of all of the program modules. As a direct result of design decision made in the implementation of program functionality, a module profile emerged for the design. The module profile i q is the unconditional probability that a module will be in execution at any epoch. The expected value for the system unreliability S U at epoch n is simply
An upper bound on this value may be obtained from ) ( where the value b is derived from the upper 2 α confidence limit for each of the transition failure estimates from equation (1) .
Over a number of epochs of successful program execution the unreliability of a system will diminish rather rapidly. Hence it only makes sense to talk about the reliability of a system on an exponential scale. The reliability of the system S R will be derived from its unreliability as follows: 
An Empirical Study
It seems pointless to engage in the academic exercise of software reliability modeling without making at least the slightest attempt to discuss the process of measuring the independent variable(s) in these models. The basic premise of this paper is that we really cannot measure temporal aspects of program failure. The state of the art in measuring these temporal aspects is best summarized by Brocklehurst [1] . There are, however, certain aspects of program behavior that we can measure and also measure with accuracy such as transitions into and out of program modules [9] . Let us now turn to the measurement scenario for the modeling process described above. For this exercise we have instrumented the SDMS system to track the transfer of control among the program modules. We have also designed an experimental scenario to introduce failures caused by specific faults in individual program modules. Three users then exercised the system performing different activities. User 1 performed information retrieval activities, displayed the retrieved records, and generated queries. User 2 performed the role of a database administrator, creating databases, modifying their structure and maintaining them User 3 entered records into a database much as a clerk would do.
There is a need to record the dynamic behavior of the total system as it transitions from one program module to another. We adapted and extended a software transition profiler called CLIC [11] . CLIC works in three phases. Phase one consist in the code instrumentation where "hooks" are added to each module of the target application in order to observe the transitions. The second phase is the profiling itself, where the target application is run and the software transitions are recorded as they occurred. The third phase is the post-processing and analysis of the collected information which was discarded under the proposed model because it is done dynamically as the data is gathered.
The target application was instrumented with CLIC following the standard procedures. The second phase of CLIC was modified to fit the model. Every time a transition was made, the information was sent to an additional function called RELEST (RELiability ESTimation) in charge of keeping track of and analyzing the system behavior. From just the simple frequency counts of program activity represented in Table 2 , we can see substantial differences in the way the three users of this system exercise this system. It is clear, for example, that neither User 1 nor User 3 would have seen the 2 failure events in module 14 nor would they have seen the failure events in modules 4 or 19. They didn't cause either of these three modules to execute. Their view of the system is rather like the three blind men who are studying the nature of the elephant by feel. Each user has a different piece of the animal.
From the distribution of activity shown in Table  2 , we can now compute the execution profiles for each user. Estimates for these profiles may be obtained by dividing the total number of epochs for each user into the individual module counts. These execution profiles for each user are shown in Table 3 . For each module under each user profile, the failure probability of each module was then calculated. The is in essence the probability of the transition to the failure state for each module. Finally, the System Reliability (Q) is calculated for each user. This value is obtained from formula (2) above and is shown in the penultimate row of Table 3 . From the System reliability for each user, we may then calculate the System Reliability (logarithmically scaled) for each user. These data are shown in the last row of Table 3 .
The three users are using the same software. that their software is considerably less reliable than User 1's perception of his system. We would now like to represent the reliability growth of a system after it has been placed back in service after a fix. To this end we will continue to monitor the activity of User 3 through an additional 1170 epochs. At intervals, the transition matrix was dumped and the reliability calculated for the elapsed number of epochs. The results of this computation is shown in Figure 2 . Here we can see a fairly rapid rise in the reliability of the system in its early stages will some attenuation in this growth over time.
Summary
The failure of a software system is dependent only on what the software is currently doing: its functionality. If a program is currently executing a functionality that is expressed in terms of a set of fault free modules, this functionality will certainly execute indefinitely without any likelihood of failure. A program may execute a sequence of fault prone modules and still not fail. In this particular case, the faults may lie in a region of the code that is not likely to be expressed during the execution of a function. A failure event can only occur when the software system executes a module that contains faults. If a functionality is never selected that drives the program into a module that contains faults, then the program will never fail. Alternatively, a program may well execute successfully in a module that contains faults just as long as the faults are in code subsets that are not executed.
The very nature of the milieu in which programs operate dictates that they will modify the behavior of the individuals that are using them. The result of this is that the user's initial use of the system as characterized by the operational profile will not necessarily reflect his/her future use of the software. There may be a dramatic shift in the operational profile of the software user based directly on the impact of the software or due to the fact the users' needs have changed over time. A design that has be established to be robust under one operational profile may become less than satisfactory under new profiles. We must come to understand that some systems may become less reliable as they mature due to circumstances external to the program environment.
The continuing evaluation of the execution, function, and module profiles over the life of a system can provide substantial information as to the changing nature of the program's execution environment. This, in turn, will foster the notion that software reliability assessment is as dynamic as the operating environment of the program. That a system has functioned reliably in its past is not a clear indication that it will function reliably in the future.
Some of the problems that have arisen in past attempts at software reliability determination all relate to the fact that their perspective has been distorted. Programs do not wear out over time. If they are not modified, they will certainly not improve over time. Nor will they get less reliable over time. The only thing that really impacts the reliability of a software system is its functionality. A program may work very well for a number of years based on the functions that it is asked to execute. This same program may suddenly become quite unreliable if its mission is changed by the user.
By keeping track of the state transitions from module to module and function to function we may learn exactly where a system is fragile. This information coupled with the functional profile will tell us just how reliable the system will be when we use it as specified. Programs make transitions from module to module as they execute. These transitions may be observed. Transitions to program modules that are fault laden will result in an increased probability of failure. We can model these transitions as a stochastic process. Ultimately, by developing a mathematical description for the behavior of the software as it transitions from one module to another driven by the functionalities that it is performing, we can describe the reliability of the functionality. The software system is the sum of its functionalities. If we can know the reliability of the functionalities and how the system apportions its time among these functionalities, we can then know the reliability of the system.
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